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In the title of our conference, Republicanism is associated to Rule of Law. In this paper, I 
would like to call into question this association, and slightly shift the focus: actually, I would like to 
emphasize the existence of a tension between politics and law, between rule of law and what may 
be defined as  rule of virtue at the very core of the republican tradition.   
Many contemporary scholars who have been concerned with rethinking the fundamental 
features of the modern republican tradition in order to re-propose it in the current theoretical 
debates, from Quentin Skinner to Philip Pettit, emphasize that modern republican thinkers have 
developed an extremely relevant notion of liberty, liberty as non-domination. They point out how 
individual and collective freedom are held together in republican theories; and how the ideal of the 
rule of law can be traced at the core of these theories, and of their criticism of monarchic 
institutions. In some of their works, scholars such as Pettit himself, bring together the rule of law 
and the rule of virtue in the republican tradition. Nonetheless, they do not sufficiently take into 
account the tensions between the two elements which are present in that tradition: law and virtue. 
My paper will be devoted to the exploration of these tensions.  
When I speak of modern republican tradition, I mainly refer to that set of theories 
formulated between the beginning of the sixteenth century and the end of the eighteenth century: in 
a concise form, one could say from Machiavelli to the authors of the Federalist Papers; or from 
Machiavelli to Kant.   
It is generally acknowledged that over the last few years, various scholars have 
distinguished different families of theories within the republican tradition: some speak of an 
aristocratic and a democratic republicanism; others underline the difference between those 
elaborations which follow Machiavelli and his praise of social and political conflicts, and those 
reflections which carry out Harrington or Rousseau’s perspectives, and their attack against the 
moment of conflict in the respublica. In this paper, I will take into account a series of elements 
which are common to the various republican theories, and I will frequently draw attention to one 
family of theories, in particular: those theories which show to be the most loyal to Machiavelli’s 
teaching.  
After examining the tension between law and politics in modern republican theories, in the 
conclusions I will attempt to show how some of the questions which the modern republicans dealt 
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with, as well as some of their assumptions, can still represent a valuable starting point for the 
elaboration of republican theories which prove to be up to the problems of  our time.  
 
2.  In modern republican theories, the republic is always considered from two perspectives: a 
static and a dynamic one, so to speak. The republican theorists are not just concerned with 
delineating in the abstract the characters of the best republic as opposed to those of principality and 
monarchy. But their works are devoted to the analysis of the orders and the magistracies of the 
republic throughout history. I will not insist on this issue which has been repeatedly pointed out by 
John Pocock. Thus, for the republican thinkers politics and history are strictly connected: politics 
and law are conceived in time.  
This element is particularly apparent when we consider the structure of their theories, and 
we compare it, for instance, with that  of modern social contract theories.  Modern social contract 
theorists, from Hobbes onward, start from an ideal experiment, namely, from the position of a 
counterfactual such as the state of nature which results in a fundamental annihilation of the social 
relations, and more generally of history. In De cive Hobbes exorts us to “to consider men as if but 
even now sprung out the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all 
kind of engagement to each other”1. Instead, the republicans do not take over this mental 
experiment, this sort of annihilatio mundi applied to the field of the political relations, but carefully 
think through the problems of the  republic in time. Thus, they take into account the question of the 
genesis of the republic, the creation and development of its institutions, as well as the moment of 
decadence of those institutions and laws, the moment of the corruption of orders and men, when the 
citizens’ active virtue fails and the very end of the republic seems to be imminent.  
It appears to me that a particular attention has been devoted over the last few years to the 
normative dimension of the republican theories: scholars tend to focus on the key -characters of the 
republic, and of the freedom that it allows, thus reading the republican theorists from a static or 
structural perspective. This has brought the aspect of the rule of law, and its prerequisites and 
consequences, to the fore. 
Instead, in this paper I would like to draw attention to that other dimension of the republican 
theories: namely, to their study of the republics in time, and throughout history, and, especially, to 
the moments of the genesis and corruption of the republics. If one considers the pages devoted to 
the genesis and corruption of the republics, one clearly observes the great relevance which the 
republican thinkers ascribed to the element of virtue - be that the virtue of the individual or of 
                                                 
1 T. Hobbes, De cive, VIII.1, ed. 1651, p. 127. See De cive, ed. Warrender, Oxford, Clarendon, 1983, p. 160: “Ut 
redeamus iterum in statum naturalem, consideremusque homines tamquam si essent iamiam subito e terra (fungorum 
more) exorti & adulti, sine omni unius ad alterum obligatione”. 
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collective bodies. It is possible therefore to detect a tension between rule of law and rule of virtue, 
between law and politics, which gives way to a variety of solutions, in their theories. 
 
3. The birth of the republican orders.  
 
When the republican thinkers tackle the question of the genesis of the republican political order, 
they are confronted, although in different ways, with two sets of problems which I intend to 
analyse, namely, a) the role played by the great legislators and the question of their virtue; b) the 
role played by social and political conflict in the creation of good orders and good laws.  
 When analysing the genesis of the republican orders in history – of the republics of Sparta, 
Athens, or Venice – and when delineating their ideal republics, most of the republican thinkers, 
even though not all of them, refer to the figure of the great founders and legislators (Solon, Moses). 
Their virtue is needed for the republic and its rule of law to exist. The characters of this virtue are 
worth exploring. To begin with, when Machiavelli starts reflecting on the experience of Rome, he 
dwells upon the role of its founder, Romulus, and questions his virtue. He points out that this virtue 
is imbued with violence: Romulus kills Remo, his brother. The foundation of the republic par 
excellence bears the marks of violence2. When Machiavelli he takes into account the founders  or 
the legislators (“the orderers”) of  other past republics, he underlines two elements: firstly, the fact 
that the legislators can resort to ‘extraordinary means’, to forms of violence, in order to carry out 
their duty3; secondly, the fact that they are lead by their virtue to pretend they are in contact with the 
gods in order to persuade the people to accept the systems conceived by them4. The Legislator’s 
virtue can entail the resort to violence as well as the strategic use of lie. 
Many modern republican thinkers, from Harrington to Sidney and Rousseau, dwell upon the 
virtue which is needed to give the right legal order to a republic. In Oceana, Harrington follows 
Machiavelli’s thought to the letter, almost paraphrasing a crucial passage from chapter nine of the 
Discourses. He claims that in order for a republic to become an ‘empire of laws’ it must be founded 
by a ‘wise legislator’. But he also adds that “any man that is master of reason [shall not] blame such 
extraordinary means as in that case shall be necessary, the end proving no other than the 
constitution of a well-ordered commonwealth”5.  
In the chapter on the “Legislator” in the Contract, Rousseau directly refers to Machiavelli 
and cites with approval the passage from the Discourses where Machiavelli claims that the 
                                                 
2 Cfr. N. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I.9, pp. 55-59. 
3 Cfr. N. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I.9, pp. 56. 
4 Cfr. N. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I.11, pp. 68: “E veramente mai non fu ordinatore di leggi straordinarie in un popolo che 
non ricorresse a Dio”.  
5 J. Harrington, Oceana, Cambridge UP, 1992, p. 67. 
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legislators must necessarily call upon the authority of the gods to persuade the people. As 
everybody knows, according to Rousseau, the legislator or lawgiwer “is in every respect an 
extraordinary man in the State. While he must be so by his genius, he is no less so by his office. It is 
not magistracy, it is not nor sovereignty. This office, which gives the Republic its constitution has 
no place in its constitution: it is a singular and superior function, that has nothing in common with 
human empire”6. 
First conclusion: tackling the question of the genesis of the republican orders, and of the 
origin of the republics’ rule of law, the republican thinkers cannot avoid thematizing the existence 
of exceptional figures who do not hesitate to resort to forms of violence and lie and manipulation in 
order to accomplish their task.   
The moment of the genesis of the rule of law represents a problem for the republican 
thinkers which is solved, in the first place, by thematizing the mythic figures of the great legislators. 
By delineating these figure, they indirectly theorize the existence of two distinct types of men with 
different capacities and virtues: this solution may be defined in the 20th century language as elitist.  
In Machiavelli, as well as in various other republican thinkers, the problem of the genesis of 
the republican order is also, and especially, approached from another perspective, following a 
different line of reasoning. Discussing the history of Rome, Machiavelli stresses the fact that the 
early roman orders ‘were defective’, that is to say, inadequate and insufficient. The ‘good laws and 
the good orders’ which characterize the roman republic in its glorious phase are brought about 
thanks to disunions and tumults which have marked the republic’s existence for many centuries. 
Social and political conflict produces good orders and good laws: conflict generates law, politics 
gives birth to the juridical orders. From a genetic perspective, politics is a primum, law is a 
posterum or a derivatum. 
Machiavelli develops his argument from a particular political anthropology: he claims that 
in all the republics, and, more generally, in all the political bodies, there are two types of men, or, as 
he calls them, two humours:  the nobles who are only concerned with the acquisition of greater 
power, and oppress the people; and the people whose only aim, instead, is to live freely7.   
I will not comment upon this kind of anthropology here: I would just like point out that the 
distinction between two humours is an unavoidable and insuperable evidence for all political 
                                                 
6 J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, II. 7, Cambridge UP, 1997, p. 69. Remember: “Cette raison sublime qui s’élève 
au-dessus de la portée des hommes vulgaires est celle dont le législateur met les décisions dans la bouche des 
immortels, pour entraîner par l’autorité divine ceux que ne pourroit ébranler la prudence humaine”. Rousseau quotes 
Machiavelli, Discorsi, I, 11: ‘There has never been in any country a lawgiver who has not invoked the deity; for 
otherwise his laws would not have been accepted. A wise man knows many useful truths which cannot be demonstrated 
in a way that will convince other people”. 
7 See N. Machiavelli, The Prince, IX, Cambridge UP, 1988, p. 34: “And this situation arises because the people do not 
want to be dominated or oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles want to dominate and oppress the people”.  
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community or political form. The disunion, the discord between these two humours brings good 
orders about in the first place: Machiavelli mentions the Tribunes of the Plebs which brought, so to 
speak, the roman mixed government to perfection. Then, he underlines the fact that, even when the 
roman orders had reached perfection, the conflict between the  plebs and the senate, the people and 
the nobles, developing ‘without sects and without partisans’ and aiming at honors rather than 
property, produced good laws for the purpose of preserving liberty. Developing within specific 
institutional channels, conflict preserves the liberty of the republic even when this has become a 
form of rule of law. Thus, Machiavelli points out the pivotal role of the element of conflict in the 
genesis of the republican orders, as well as in the phase of their complete development and ordinary 
functioning, when a sort of constitutional balance among the parties has been reached.  
 Seemingly liberty is the result of orders and laws, but in the last resort it is the effect of the 
political conflict produced by those different natures, those humours aiming at different ends. If one 
considers this thesis in perspective, this means that Machiavelli formulates a tension between 
politics and law, recognizing a sort of logical priority of politics over law8. 
  As you all know, Machiavelli’s “tumultuos republic” has not always been enthusiastically 
supported by modern republican thinkers. Important theorists, from Guicciardini to Harrington and 
Rousseau, did not follow Machiavelli in his attempt to keep order and conflict together, that is, in 
his effort to prove that conflicts can be regarded as physiological and not just as pathological. 
Nonetheless, I would like to point out that there have been other thinkers who followed in his 
footsteps, and consciously refromulated his thinking: from Commonwelth-men such as Algernon 
Sidney and John Trenchard, to a scottish philosopher such as Adam Ferguson, and to another Italian 
thinker such as Vittorio Alfieri.Different approaches and priorities in these two families of theories 
are particularly apparent when one deals with the question of the ordinary functioning of the 
republic, to which I intend to draw my attention now. 
 
4. The republican institutions in time.  
 
All the modern republican theorists of the most diverse families of the tradition repeatedly and 
firmly state the possibility of the dissolution of the republican orders, and of the rise of principality, 
absolute monarchy, despotism. The specter of tyrannical power, of absolute power, of despotic 
power, according to the different terms employed by these authors, recurs in all of them.   
                                                 
8 The crisis of liberty makes the logical, as well as genetic primacy of politics over law even more apparent. When the 
Nobles create parties, and sects develop in the republics, organized as interest groups; viceversa, when the people does 
not aim at honours any longer, but to property, namely, when the conflict ceases to be political and becomes exclusively 
social and economical, civil war breaks out and the republican orders break down. Then the republic is replaced by 
principality.  
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 In order to avoid such possibility, the republican thinkers resort to different theoretical 
strategies: some of them rely exclusively on the republic’s institutional architecture, on its peculiar 
institutions, above all, the mixed government; others, even though they recognize the importance of 
the institutions and of the rule of law guaranteed by them, in the last resort, insist on the crucial role 
of the citizens’ active virtue and public spirit.  
 Scholars have extensively dwelled upon the fundamental characters of the republican 
institutions theorized by the modern thinkers, and upon the forms of rule of law and the type of 
liberty guaranteed by them. I will not insist on their analyses, here. I would just like to draw 
attention to the rich and complex institutional imagination of the republican thinkers.  They work on 
the classical models of the republics of Athens, Sparta and Rome, but they also take into account 
the institutions of that respublica hebraeorum brought back to light in the studies of Sigonius and 
Cunaeus. Then, they systematically compare these classical Greek, Latin and Judaic models with 
the  experience of the modern republics, from Venice to the United Provinces.  
Some form of mixture, of the Aristotelian mikté, guarantees the balance between the various 
constitutional organs, and allows to preserve liberty. On this point, the claims of republicanism and 
the requirements of constitutionalism converge. Obviously, each thinker provides a particular 
interpretation of the idea of mixed or balanced government – some insist on the aristocratic 
dimension, others (probably a minority) on the democratic aspects.  As a matter of fact, Machiavelli 
belongs to the latter: in his Discourses he emphasizes the importance of a series of magistracies or 
institutional procedures –  public accusations, political indictments and appeals, deliberating 
assemblies – which constituted the people’s power,  as John McCormick has recently pointed out 
vigorously. 
 Among the other institutional remedies propounded by the republicans in order to preserve 
liberty, I would like to recall at least the idea of the small republic, and of a federation of small 
republics which started to circulate, for instance, in the English republicanism of the second half of 
the seventeenth century, from John  Milton to Andrew Fletcher.          
 While all the republican thinkers dwell attentively upon the institutional architecture of the 
republic, the difference between the various families of republican theories fully emerges in the 
discussion of the overall relevance and ultimate significance of the institutions in their ordinary 
functioning. Theorists such as Guicciardini, Harrington or Rousseau who value order above 
conflict, show to rely entirely on the institutional architectures in order to guarantee the law and, by 
means of that, the citizens’ liberty. Nonetheless, within modern republicanism, there are also other 
thinkers and families of theories which, even considering the ordinary functioning of the republic, 
lay stress on the importance of the active virtue of the citizens rather than on the institutional 
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remedies in order to preserve freedom. [In this sense, they reformulate Machiavelli’s thinking.] This 
morning, in order to give an idea of this approach  I will focus, especially, on the thought of a 
Scottish republican theorist, Adam Ferguson.  
In his Essay on the History of Civil Society, Ferguson draws his argument from the recognition 
of the institutional and political relevance of the mixed governments, and cites Rome and modern 
England as paradigmatic examples9. He goes as far as declaring that England, in particular, “has 
carried the authority and government of law to a point of perfection, which they never before 
attained in the history of mankind”10. But he immediately becomes critical: Ferguson points out that 
liberty and justice cannot be preserved by relying exclusively on laws and institutions: ‘It is not in 
mere laws, after all, that we are to look for the securities to justice, but in the powers by which those 
laws have been obtained, and without whose constant support they must fall to disuse. Statutes 
serve to record the rights of a people, and speak the intention of parties to defend what the letter of 
the law has expressed: but without the vigour to maintain what is acknowledged as a right, the mere 
record, or the feeble intention, is of little avail’.11 Ferguson insists on this idea in various other 
pages of his Essay on the History of Civil Society – he writes, for instance: ‘If forms of proceeding, 
written statutes, or other constituents of law, cease to be enforced by the very spirit from which they 
arose; they serve only to cover, not to restrain the iniquities of power. [...] [And the influence of 
laws, where they have any real effect in the preservation of liberty, is not any magic power 
descending from shelves that are loaded with books, but is, in reality, the influence of men resolved 
to be free; of men, who, having adjusted in writing the terms on which they are to live with the 
state, and with their fellow-subjects, are determine, by their vigilance and spirit, to make these 
terms observed’12]. The idea that liberty cannot be preserved only by political institutions is a sort 
of  leit-motiv of his work. In another passage, he writes: ‘Even political establishments, though they 
appear to be independent of the will and arbitration of men, cannot be relied on for the preservation 
of freedom; they may nourish, but should not supersede that firm and resolute spirit, with which the 
liberal mind is always prepared to resist indignities, and to refer its safety to itself’13. 
Ferguson’s position is clear: in the last resort, virtue – ‘that firm and resolute spirit’ - is more 
important than political institutions, active political participation and power are more important than 
law. It is not a chance that Ferguson takes over another Machiavellian issue, developing a real 
praise of political conflict in various passages of his work:  “When we seek in society for the order 
                                                 
9 A. Ferguson,  Essay, Cambridge UP, 1995,  p. 159: “Rome and England, under their mixed governments, the one 
inclining to democracy, the other to monarchy, have proved the great legislators among nations”. 
10 A. Ferguson, Essay, Cambridge UP, 1995, p. 159. 
11 A. Ferguson, Essay, Cambridge UP, 1995, p. 160. 
12 A. Ferguson, Essay, Cambridge UP, 1995, p. 249. 
13 A. Ferguson, Essay, Cambridge UP, 1995, p. 251. 
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of mere inaction and tranquillity, we forget the nature of our subject, and we find the order of 
slaves, not that of free men”14. Or even: “The rivalship of separate communities, and the agitations 
of a free people, are the principles of political life, and the school of men”15. 
 
5. The problem of corruption. 
 
The question of corruption of the institutional orders, as well as of the citizens’ active virtue is the 
pivot of the republican thinkers’ analyses in all time and culture. How do the orders become 
corrupted? And what determines the crisis of the republic? What processes determine the 
weakening or dissolution of public virtue and of the citizens’ devotion to the common good? These 
questions lead the republican thinkers to develop increasingly more detailed accounts of the great 
historical transformations which were taking place at the time.  
Machiavelli devotes a large part of his work to the analysis of the different ways in which the 
republics become corrupted. In the Discourses, in particular, he explores the transformation of 
conflicts in Rome from strictly political to social and economical enmities. He draws attention to 
the reaction of the Nobles against the Gracchi’s proposals for an agrarian reform which attacked 
their control over land property. In the Istorie fiorentine he denounces the way in which political 
conflict was lead in Florence: the oppositions gave birth to ‘sects and partisans’ which degenerated 
into violent actions.  
At the end of the seventeenth century, the English Commonwealth-men consider the creation of 
permanent (standing) armies a definite cause of corruption; in the early decades of the eighteenth 
century, others detected in patronage and, more generally, in the Crown’s attempts to control the 
Parliament, definite threats to liberty. Finally, other republican thinkers denounced the creation of 
large-sized States, and the republics’ tendency to expand, as a definite cause of corruption and a 
threat to republican liberty. The typologies of institutional, political and moral corruption are 
extremely articulate.  
I am not interested in drawing your attention to these typologies, but rather, on the remedies 
detected by the republican thinkers to put a stop to these corruptive processes, because they attest 
the existence of a tension between law and politics, between rule of law and rule of virtue, in their 
reflections. 
Magistracies are conceived by the republican thinkers in order to hold corruption in check: for 
instance, censorship which is exercised over the citizen’s conduct16; dictatorial authority which 
                                                 
14 A. Ferguson, Essay, Cambridge UP, 1995, p. 254, footnote 97. 
15 A. Ferguson, Essay, Cambridge UP, 1995, pp. 62-63. 
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must be instituted in extraordinary conditions of political crisis17. In my view, both these 
magistracies are interesting for they require the existence of particularly virtuous individuals within 
the body of citizens. Again, many republican thinkers thematize the exercise of virtue by 
extraordinary individuals or groups of individuals in order to restore the rule of law. One can 
describe this position as an elitist one, non democratic in the proper sense. The overall mechanism 
of a republican government includes elements which are not strictly speaking democratic, but which 
can be defined as aristocratic or elitist.  
From this perspective, I find it even more relevant to re-consider Machiavelli’s reflection upon 
what he calls the republics’ ‘return to the beginning’. The return to the beginning is necessary when 
the republics start to become corrupted, when “men begin to change their customs and transgress 
the laws”18.  Although, according to Machiavelli, the return to the beginning can be expected and 
realized by the orders of the republic itself, or brought about by the good men’s virtue, one should 
not forget what he writes in that crucial opening chapter of the third book of the Discourses: in 
order to have an authentic change and return to the beginning, “the orders need to resume new life 
from the virtue of a single  citizen”19. In order to put a stop to corruption, and bring the institutions 
back to their function and original ‘goodness’, the virtue of remarkable individuals is necessary.   
A virtue which is also carried out by sentencing to death and executing the ‘sons of Brutus’, and 
all other enemy of the Republic. Those sentences and executions act as examples, somehow 
reviving the citizens’ virtue. Machiavelli is extremely crude in this respect: the memory of 
punishment produces fear in those who intend to attack the republic. “Unless something arises 
which recalls the punishment to their memory, and revives the fear in their minds, so many 
delinquents will soon come together that they cannot any longer be punished without danger”20. 
Machiavelli repeatedly points out that these executions must take place at least once every decade 
in order to keep fear alive, and to keep the respect of the law constant among the citizens, that is to 
say, in order to avoid the spreading of corruption.   
Machiavelli raises a problem of an unquestionable relevance: the problem of the renewal of the 
institutions and customs for the survival of the existing republic. “If one wishes a sect or a republic 
                                                                                                                                                                  
16 On censorship, see N. Machiavelli, Discorsi, I. 49 and  J.-J. Rousseau, Social Contract, IV. 7, pp. 141-142. 
See also F. Hutcheson,  Institutio, Glasgow 1745, p. 309; Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Glasgow 1747, p. 
301: «A censorial power too would be of the highest use, to reform, or prevent the corruption of manners». In  A System 
of Moral Philosophy, London 1755,  vol. 2, p. 265, Hutcheson argues it is better to give the censorial  power not to a 
single individual, but to a «censorial  council for a set term changed by rotation».   
17 On dictatorship, e.g., J.-J. Rousseau, Social Contract, IV, 6, pp. 138-140. 
18 N. Machiavelli, Discorsi, III.1, p. 359: “gli uomini cominciano a variare con i costumi e trapassare le leggi”. 
19 N. Machiavelli, Discorsi, III.1, p. 358: “I quali ordini hanno bisogno di essere fatti vivi dalla virtù d’uno cittadino, il 
quale animosamente concorra ad eseguirli contro alla potenza di quegli che gli trapassano”. 
20 N. Machiavelli,  Discorsi, III.1, p. 359: “E se non nasce cosa per la quale si riduca loro a memoria la pena, e 
rinnuovisi negli animi loro la paura, concorrono tosto tanti delinquenti che non possono più punire senza pericolo”. 
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to live long, it is necessary to draw it back often toward its beginning” is, precisely, the title of that 
chapter. What is at stake here, above all, is the  conduct of the individuals which tends to destroy 
the laws and orders, rather than the renewal of the orders themselves. Thus, the way in which such 
conduct may be changed by those who are interested in keeping the republican orders [– translating 
this in a different context, and in a different language, one can say that what is at stake is the 
relation between democratic institutions and democratic education of the citizen].  
Machiavelli’s solutions are extremely distant from our contemporary sensitivity, nonetheless the 
problem he raises is crucial. And it is not a chance that it attracted the attention of many later 
republican thinkers, starting, for instance, from a commonwealth-man such as Algernon Sidney. 
 I would like to add a further remark, before passing to the conclusions. When one considers on 
the whole the modern reflection on the republic in time, and, especially, on its genesis and 
corruption, it appears that the republican thinkers appealed to virtue (of the individuals or of small 
elites) in order to tackle extremely relevant questions. Thus, it is not surprising that later thinkers 
and men of action – I am thinking in particular of the French revolutionaries, especially, the 
Jacobins – focused their attention on, and referred to this specific dimension of their thought. I think 
that Hannah Arendt’s remarks in On Revolution concerning the possible origin and indirect sources 
of Rousseau’s ‘despotism of freedom’ are still valid and evocative21.I am persuaded that they are 
thought-provoking in years when we are tempted by stylized reconstructions of the history of 
republicanism for our own use that select and bring to the fore themes which are closer to our 
sensitivity.  
 
 
5. Elements for a conclusion.  
 
What lessons can we draw from the history that I have summarised? I would like to conclude with 
three remarks. 
 
a) The constitutive tension between law and politics.  
The first remark concerns the constitutive and insuperable tension between law and politics. I 
emphasised how the modern republican thinkers refer to the virtue of single men or small elites in 
order to explain the birth of the republics, and to thematize the remedies to their internal corruption. 
When taking into account figures such as those of the States’ founders or legislators, magistracies 
                                                 
21 See H. Arendt, On Revolution, tr. it., p. 238. 
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such as censorship or dictatorship, moments such as the return to the beginning, they associate the 
rule of law with the rule of virtue.  
Furthermore, I have shown how those republican thinkers who follow Machiavelli’s teaching on 
the positive role of conflicts go even further, and trace a tension between law and politics, between 
rule of law and rule of virtue in the ordinary functioning of  the republic itself.  When they refer to 
the tumultuous and conflicting virtue of the citizens, they seem to delineate an almost logical and 
genetic priority of politics over law.   
I believe that it is extremely important, today, that we are aware of the tension between law and 
politics, between rule of law and rule of virtue, and that we do not forget the modern republicans’ 
lesson: politics cannot be totally translated into law. Law cannot completely absorb the Zuidersee of 
politics. 
 
a) The heritage of conflictual republicanism.  
The second remark concerns the possibility of fruitfully combining republic and conflict. As I said 
at the beginning of my paper, there are various families of republican theories: those which value 
the moment of order in the republic, and take over the perspective, for instance, of Guicciardini or 
Harrington, on the one hand; and on the other, those theories which appropriate and develop 
Machiavelli’s thought, recognizing the role played by social and political conflict within the life of 
the republic.  
 Firstly, I argue that this specific dimension of Machiavelli’s thought can play a relevant part 
in rethinking a form of conflictual republicanism today. In other words, this dimension / heritage of 
Machiavelli’s work could concur in formulating an agonistic conception of democracy, namely, one 
which does not exclusively focus on consensus. Allow me to further elucidate my interpretation of 
Machiavelli’s thought.  
To begin with, conflict appears to be rooted in anthropologies, in two different humours. 
There are men who are constantly concerned with increasing their power, and others who prefer to 
live freely without entering the logic of power acquisition and accumulation. Furthermore, conflict 
seems to be rooted in society and history: there is a difference of interests, to put it mildly, or, to 
state it more precisely, there is a radical difference in the access to and control over property. 
Machiavelli is explicit about the fact that in Rome conflict degenerates, precisely, when it starts 
concerning property (‘la roba’), when the agrarian law questions the control over property. It 
follows that, in Machiavelli’s view, conflict is a constitutive dimension of politics which cannot be 
renounced.  
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 Both realistic premises can be reformulated in contemporary language, and placed at the 
core of a republican or democratic theory for the present time. A realistic anthropology can be 
redefined which avoids both the mythicizing of the people  and the sanctification of the multitude. 
Thus, one can take over the Machiavellian lesson of the unsurpassable and fruitful dimension of 
conflict, without embracing Antonio Negri’s conclusions.  
Moreover, it is possible to ground our political theory on a social theory which admits the 
existence of radical differences of access to and control over the most diverse goods (from capital to 
culture) in contemporary society. This political theory can be developed from the premises of a 
constitutively divided society without necessarily having to accept the conclusions of a Schmittian 
theory of the political.  
Given that society is constitutively divided, according to various cleavages which are rooted 
in anthropological and social conditions, a republican theory which is up to the present times could 
admit, on new grounds, the role of social and political conflicts in the creation of the ‘orders and 
laws in defence of liberty’.  That is to say, it could acknowledge the role played by conflicts in 
widening the framework of existing law, and making richer and more complex that table of rights 
guaranteed by the rule of law.  
A republican theory which is up to the present times, a seriously agonistic theory of 
democracy, should admit the relevance of social and political conflict – a much greater relevance 
than the one accorded to it, for instance, in the contestatory democracy approach.  
In the contestatory democracy propounded by Philip Pettit, citizens have an ‘effective 
opportunity to contest the decisions of their representatives’: the actors of conflict are the citizens – 
without any further anthropological or social characterization – and the representatives, the 
“government agents wielding discretionary authority”. Conflict has a vertical nature, so to speak, 
between citizens and representatives, and it takes place after law is created, and when it is applied 
by the government’s representatives. Threats to liberty come only from above, from the political 
representatives.  
The type of conflict that I am thinking about, and which should be admitted and valued in a 
republican theory up to the present times, has both a horizontal and vertical dimension: it is both 
social conflict and political conflict. It includes both the social conflict between citizens belonging 
to different social groups, and the more political conflict  between citizens and representatives. 
Moreover, the role played by conflict should not be restricted to the moment of the application of 
the law, but should also be traced back to the moment of its creation, elaboration and discussion.  
From this perspective, threats to liberty come from the sphere of society, as well as from the sphere 
of politics.   
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c) The republic in time: corruption and de-politicization. 
 
It is possible to draw a third set of considerations concerning the problem of corruption from the 
reconstruction of the tensions between law and politics in modern republicanism which I proposed.  
I would like to conclude by mentioning the importance of the modern republicans’ analyses on 
corruption. Although their remedies are distant from our contemporary democratic sensitivity, the 
problems which they attempt to solve are still relevant today.  
The problem of corruption - especially, of the citizens’ virtue – concerns us directly. In our 
language, the problem of corruption can be defined as the problem of de-politicization. With their 
recourse to the extraordinary virtue of great men, and often to violence, the republican thinkers 
propound a series of remedies to corruption which could not be more distant from the contemporary 
democratic spirit. But their analyses of the various forms of corruption is worth retrieving.  
The republican thinkers investigate the cultural, ideological and institutional elements which 
lead  individuals to withdraw from the political sphere, and refuse to participate in collective events: 
consider Machiavelli’s diagnosis of  Christianity as a radical factor of de-politicization and moral 
corruption or the analyses of the eighteenth century thinkers on the institutional transformations of 
the sphere of the State; [ the affirmation of standing armies,  the development of increasingly 
bureaucratic administrative systems, and the primacy of representation as the only channel for 
political expression].  
I would like to point out that modern republican thinkers develop a critical perspective on 
the modern world.  Beside the normative elaborations on the features of  republican liberty or the 
institutional structures of the well-ordered republic, their reflections also include a critical analysis 
of their time. One detects a research of the pathologies of their contemporary times, one could 
probably say: an aspect of critical theory.  
So, I wonder whether this critical dimension should be re-proposed and should receive new 
emphasis in our reformulations of the republican themes. A reflection on what the modern 
republicans called the processes of corruption, perhaps,  could lead us to focus our attention on the 
contemporary forms of corruption. Perhaps it could lead us to question the contemporary forms of 
depoliticization and  press us to investigate the old and new factors which determine it. But this is 
another story. Thank you for your attention and patience.  
 
 
